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The Puzzle of Cooperation in a Game of Chicken: 
An Experimental Study 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The puzzle of cooperation has attracted and continues to attract social scientists 
seeking to explain why, in real life, many people tend to exhibit cooperative patterns of 
behaviour despite strong incentives to free-ride. Indeed, in the absence of any monetary 
incentive, why do individuals choose to cooperate, when they may be betrayed by their 
partner?  
During the last decade, there has been a surge of experimental research devoted to the 
investigation of individuals‟ propensity to cooperate in one-shot interactions. A variety of 
two- and multiple-person games (prisoner‟s dilemma game, trust game, public good game or 
game of chicken) have been studied to capture „social dilemma‟ situations, in which self-
interest behaviour leads to an outcome that is worse for everyone concerned (Hardin 1971; 
Baron 2008). A common result of these diverse experiments is one major and recurrent 
phenomenon: the level of cooperation observed is much higher than predicted by theory (see, 
among many others, Berg et al. 1995; Güth et al. 1997).  
Several kinds of theoretical explanations have been proposed and empirically 
investigated to resolve the puzzle of cooperation, ranging from biological to ecological, 
anthropological and social features of evolution (Ridley 1997). In this respect, social identity-
related factors (Dawes et al. 1988; Kollock 1998b; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Wit and 
Wilke 1992), social norms (Thogersen 2008), as well as socio-demographic and cultural 
factors (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 1999; Gächter et al. 2004) have been found to play a 
role in the prevalence of cooperative behaviour. In the same vein, personality
1
 can be shown 
to strongly affect behaviour in interactive settings, with aggressive people being less 
cooperative than sociable ones (Boone et al. 1999).  
Cooperation is also induced when cheating generates psychological costs that 
individuals want to avoid. More generally, some agents appear to be motivated by 
considerations of “fairness” and “reciprocity” that may make them opt for cooperation 
(Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; Dawes and Thaler 1988; Falk and 
                                                 
1
 In that study, personality was captured through such indicators as sensations seeking or locus of control. 
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Fischbacher 2006; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Levine 1998; Rabin 1993). Finally, cognitive 
limitations may lead some subjects to use in one-shot games the rules of thumb they have 
developed in repeated games (Goeree and Holt 2001), which may increase cooperation in 
experimental settings.  
While the above-mentioned arguments make an important contribution to explaining 
why people cooperate much more than they are expected to, the present paper attempts to 
extend these findings along two hitherto less explored dimensions. Herein lies the original 
contribution of our work.    
The first point concerns the specific nature of the game involved in our experimental 
study, namely a „Game of Chicken‟. Strangely enough, while the „Prisoner‟s Dilemma Game‟ 
(PDG), emblematic of Pareto-inferior outcomes that result from non-cooperation, has been 
extensively studied, the game of chicken, representing a social dilemma issuing from non-
coordination, has been largely neglected by experimentalists. Thus, by focussing on the game 
of chicken, we push the frontiers of our understanding of social dilemmas further.  
As in the (PDG), in the game of chicken, each partner appears to benefit more from 
bilateral cooperation than from bilateral defection. But, contrary to what happens in the PDG, 
if the agent expects her partner to defect, she will have interest to cooperate, and she will be 
declared the “chicken” of the game. Therefore, in the game of chicken, two pure equilibria 
exist (corresponding to unilateral cooperation and unilateral defection respectively), with no 
dominating strategy. The game of chicken thus appears to be a realistic description of 
strategic interactions, which is particularly suitable for describing relations between 
individuals, firms, institutions, social groups, political parties and countries that wish to 
coordinate for mutual benefit. It has also been used to describe military or political conflict 
(Snyder 1971; Stone 2001), as well as negotiations regarding environmental conventions 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Ward 1993).  
The second point has to do with agent heterogeneity, a fact of real-life that most 
models in economic theory, and particularly in game theory, assume away. This is however 
changing as evidence mounts from experiments confirming that agent homogeneity is the 
exception rather than being the rule. For instance, some recent and stimulating empirical 
results on cooperation suggest that, even though a non negligible minority or even a majority 
of subjects exhibit self-interest maximizing preferences, a significant proportion also exhibit 
other-regarding preferences (Erlei 2008). Furthermore, using data from a wide range of 
experiments, Fehr and Gächter (2000) (cited in Camerer 2003) estimate that 40 to 66% of the 
subjects show a preference for reciprocity, while only 20 to 30% of them care about their sole 
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monetary gains (the remaining subjects do not seem to have very clearly defined preferences). 
A recent experimental study involving a Game of Chicken (Neugebauer et al. 2008) suggests 
that, even though most of the subjects (83%) tend to behave in a self-interested way and to 
maximize their monetary gains, some of them appear to favour reciprocity and equity.  
Though experimental results have confirmed the over-whelming presence of agent 
heterogeneity, they have not attempted to measure its consequences in strategic settings. In 
contrast, the objective of the present paper is precisely to investigate the impact of „agent 
heterogeneity‟ on cooperative behaviour in a game of chicken, using a context-free 
experimental setting with incomplete information. To that purpose, we use the theoretical 
framework proposed by Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2007) (CDR 2007 in the following). 
The original feature of the CDR model is that it involves a population with two types of 
agents, namely the „payoff maximizers‟, or „strategic cooperators‟ (who do not cooperate 
unless it is in their interest to do so), and the „unconditional cooperators‟ (who always choose 
to cooperate
2
). Under the assumption of heterogeneity (in terms of preferences), the 
uncertainty as regards the partner‟s behaviour is twofold: endogenous uncertainty – as regards 
the action that could be chosen by the partner – strengthened by the uncertainty as regards her 
type (since her behaviour now also depends on her type). Then it examines (among other 
things) how the level of cooperation is affected by the heterogeneity of the population, i.e. by 
the probability that one faces a partner with different preferences.  
The above-mentioned framework allows us to examine how, and to what extent, the 
structure of the population and the structure of the payoffs are likely to affect cooperative 
behaviour. Our experimental design was formulated to identify each subject‟s type before 
investigating the following four predictions of the CDR model:  
1. The higher the proportion of „strategic cooperators‟ in the population (or, in other 
words, the higher the probability to meet and play against a „strategic cooperator‟), 
the higher their probability to cooperate. 
2. A minimum proportion of „strategic cooperators‟ in the population is required to 
induce a cooperative behaviour on their part. 
3. Beyond the same threshold (i.e. beyond the same given proportion of „strategic 
cooperators‟ in the population), the level of cooperation in the whole population 
no longer depends on the proportion of „strategic cooperators‟, but is only affected 
by the structure of the payoffs. 
                                                 
2
 Their actions are driven by some other motives than opportunism (e.g. self respect, altruism, ethical 
considerations). 
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4. The higher the unilateral defection (resp. unilateral cooperation) gain, the lower 
(resp. higher) the level of cooperation among the „strategic cooperators‟. 
 
The central results of our experiment can be summarized as follows. Our experimental 
data show individuals to have a much higher propensity to cooperate than predicted: the 
observed proportion of cooperative choices turns out to be systematically 20 to 50 points 
higher than theoretically expected. The data also suggest that agent heterogeneity matters: the 
higher the proportion of „strategic cooperators‟ in the population, the higher their probability 
to cooperate. Finally, our experiments confirm that higher rewards to cooperation (embedded 
in the payoff structure) tend to lower defection. 
The present experimental results offer some interesting prospects for the extension of 
game-theoretic models concerned with both agent heterogeneity and cooperation. In 
particular, they suggest that some of the gap between predicted and observed cooperative 
behaviour might be due to the underweighting/overweighting of the probability of partnering 
with a player of a specific type. In this respect, it would be worth considering that the subjects 
might be non-expected utility maximizers, dealing with both outcomes and probabilities in a 
non-linear manner, as „Rank Dependent Utility‟ or „Prospect Theory‟ for instance seem to 
suggest. In other words, it would be worth incorporating more sophisticated risk preferences 
into models with agent heterogeneity, in order to allow the impact of non-linear probability 
weighting on cooperative behaviour to be investigated in a more systematic manner.  
The theoretical framework and the predictions that our experimental study was 
designed to test are presented in more detail in section 2. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design and procedure. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the results and discussion respectively. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical framework and predictions 
 
CDR (2007) is based on a two-person two-stage game of chicken with incomplete 
information. For the sake of simplicity, and with no loss of generality, only the one-stage 
version of the model will be presented here
3
. As said in the introduction, the population of the 
players is assumed to consist of two kinds of agents, called „strategic cooperators‟ (denoted 
                                                 
3
 The pilot experiment was run using the two-stage version of the game, involving a first choice between entry 
and non entry, and, in case of entry, a second choice between cooperation and non cooperation. The resulting 
choice situations appeared to be too complex for the subjects, resulting in poor concentration and unreliable 
answers.  
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SCs in the following) and „unconditional cooperators‟ (denoted UCs) respectively. The SCs 
are expected-value maximizers and choose not to cooperate unless it pays to do so. 
Consequently, the SCs can either defect, choosing action d, or cooperate, opting for action c. 
By contrast, the UCs follow the simple rule always to cooperate, whether it pays to do so or 
not. Their only option is thus to choose cooperation and play c.  
In the game, each player knows her own type and has some probabilistic information 
about the type of her partner. Let p  (0, 1) be the probability that the player‟s partner is a SC. 
This probability is exogenously given and is common knowledge to all players. Notice that p 
can also be interpreted as the proportion of SCs in the population. Besides, each player 
expresses a belief as regards the behaviour of her fellow player. The game is symmetrical, in 
the sense that the structure of the payoffs and the beliefs of players of the same type are 
assumed to be identical. For each player, her endogenous belief that her fellow player will not 
cooperate if she is a SC is given by a probability and it lies in the interval (0, 1). So, her 
belief that her partner (whatever her type) will cooperate is given by the probability (1 p )
4
.  
The payoff structure of the game is as follows. Each player wins X if both players 
cooperate and Y if they both deviate. If a SC defects while her partner cooperates, she gets H 
> X while her partner gets L > Y with L < X. This payoff structure clearly captures the essence 
of the Game of Chicken. The matrix of the game is given in Figure 1.  
d
c
dc
Player j
Player  i
L ; H
H ; L Y ; Y
X ; X1 
1 


 
Figure 1. A typical matrix of the Game of Chicken (H > X > L > Y). 
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 This probability corresponds to the probability 1-p to meet a UC (who always cooperates) added to the 
probability (1-) p to meet a SC who chooses to cooperate.  
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The game of chicken allows multiple equilibria. Since defection is not a dominant 
strategy, it is possible that, at least in some equilibria, cooperation prevails even among the 
SCs
5
. Here, we will focus on those situations in which cooperation can be observed, i.e. in 
which the SCs will choose to cooperate with a positive probability  1 0  . Besides, since 
the structure of the payoffs and the beliefs of players of the same type are assumed to be 
identical, only symmetrical equilibria will be considered. 
 For a SC, a necessary condition for cooperation is that her expected returns from 
cooperation be greater than those from defection. This condition is given by: 
   (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )p X L p X p H Y p H             
In other words, we have:  
(1 ) , w ith 
( ) ( )
L Y
p T T
H X L Y


  
  
      
Some remarks should be made at this stage. First, in a game of chicken, cooperation is 
possible but never certain. In fact, it can be shown that the exact probability with which a SC 
will defect is given by 
1 T
p


 . Second, a necessary condition for cooperation to emerge is 
that the probability of non-defection (i.e. the probability that the partner chooses cooperation), 
given by  1 p , be not too high. When  1 p  is equal or superior to a given value T, i.e. 
when  1 p T   (with 1  ), it is always optimal for a SC to deviate (The details of the 
proofs are given in CDR, 2007). 
 
Result: In the one-shot one-stage game of chicken under consideration, the symmetrical Nash 
equilibrium is such that: 
(i) Whenever (1 )p T  , SCs will cooperate with a probability (1 – ) such that: 
 
 
1 1
1 1 1
( )
T H X
p p H X L Y

 
    
  
. 
(ii) Whenever (1 )p T  , SCs will always defect ( 1  ).  
                                                 
5
 It is a well-known result in standard game theory (when all players are assumed to be „self-interested‟) that any 
Game of Chicken offers three equilibria, two of them involving pure strategies. In this case, one of the players 
initiates a conflict and the other one chooses to cooperate, leading the latter to be declared the « chicken » of the 
game. The last equilibrium involves completely mixed strategies, with each player assigning a positive 
probability to each of her strategies, so as to maximize her payoffs. So,  1 - L L H    corresponds to the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game when there is no heterogeneity in the population, i.e. when all the 
players are assumed to be „self-interested‟.  
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Remembering that the a priori probability p that the partner be a SC may also be interpreted 
as the proportion of SCs in the population, the following four testable predictions P1 to P4 
can be drawn from the previous result.  
 
P1:  A minimum proportion  1 T  of SCs in the population is necessary to induce a 
cooperative behaviour on their part.  
When the population contains only a few SCs, these will always defect because they know 
that their partner is very likely to cooperate (see Figure 2, left part). 
 
P2: When  1p T  , the higher the proportion p of SCs in the population, the stronger their 
incentive to cooperate.  
When  1p T  , 
 1 T
p


  at equilibrium. So, the probability assigned by a SC to 
defection decreases when p increases (see Figure 2, right part). Note that, for p = 1, 1 T   . 
This corresponds to the standard mixed-strategy equilibrium when there is no heterogeneity in 
the population, i.e. when the population contains only expected-value maximizers (SCs). 
p
 p
1
0
1
1-T
1-T
Proportion of SCs in the population
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
o
f 
d
e
fe
c
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o
n
o
f 
a
 S
C
 
Figure 2. Predicted probability of defection  depending on the proportion of SCs  
in the population (with H = 120, L = 70, X = 100 and Y = 50). 
 
P3: For any given Game of Chicken structure of payoffs and for any population 
with  1p T  , the proportion of cooperative agents in the whole population is constant and 
equal to T.  
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As long as the proportion p of SCs remains lower than  1 T , the expected return from 
defection remains higher than that from cooperation, and any SC must defect whatever the 
game of chicken payoff structure ( 1  ). Therefore, the proportion of agents who cooperate 
in the whole population is equal to the proportion  1 p of UCs in the population (see Figure 
3, left part).  
When p becomes higher than  1 T , the probability of defection (given by the probability  
at equilibrium), decreases as p increases. Quite remarkably, the exogenous increase in the 
proportion p of SCs is exactly counterbalanced by the decrease in their endogenous 
propensity to defect , so that the proportion p of agents who defect in the whole population 
becomes constant and equal to 1 T . Alternately, the proportion  1 p  of agents who 
cooperate in the whole population is constant and equal to T (see Figure 3, right part). 
1
1 T
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Figure 3. Predicted proportion of cooperative choices in the whole population  
depending on the proportion of SCs in the population  
(with H = 120, L = 70, X = 100 and Y = 50).  
 
P4a: The probability of defection  is an increasing function of the return from unilateral 
defection (H). 
P4b: The probability of defection  is a decreasing function of the return from unilateral 
cooperation (L).  
 
( ) ( )
L Y
T
H X L Y


  
 is a decreasing function of H and an increasing function of L. Since 
 1 T
p


 ,  appears to be a decreasing function of T, thus an increasing function of H and a 
decreasing function of L. 
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Now, let us present the design of our experimental study, which aimed at testing the previous 
four predictions P1 to P4. 
 
3. The experimental design 
 
The final experiment included 85 subjects of which 45 were female. All the subjects 
were between 22 and 28 years old. Most of them were undergraduate students in Economics; 
the remaining ones were undergraduates in Mathematics. All of them were aware of game 
theory and decision theory, but with no specific skills in these topics. 
The experiment was run during January and February 2007, and consisted in three 
successive and at least 15-days spaced independent sessions. In each session, the subjects‟ 
task consisted in the filling out of a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Only the results from the 
first session/questionnaire will be reported here.  
The questionnaire consisted of three separate parts, including several interactive 
choice situations each. In each choice situation, the subject was given a specific Game of 
Chicken payoff structure (with X, Y, H and L as in Figure 1 supra) as well as some 
probabilistic information about the type of her partner (being either a SC with a probability p 
or a UC with a probability  1 p ) and asked to decide whether to cooperate or not with her. 
X (bilateral cooperation gain) and Y (bilateral defection gain) were given the same values X = 
100 € and Y = 50 € throughout the questionnaire.  
The first part of the questionnaire aimed at investigating whether the subjects‟ 
behaviour changes as the proportion of SCs in the population increases from 0 to 1 (or, 
alternately, as the probability to meet a SC grows from 0 to 1), with the unilateral defection 
gain H and the unilateral cooperation gain L being kept constant and given the values H = 120 
€ and L = 70 € respectively (predictions P1, P2, P3). The second part of the questionnaire 
was designed to investigate whether the subjects‟ behaviour changes as the value of the 
unilateral defection gain H increases from 100 € to 190 €, with p = 0.75 and L being kept 
constant and given the value L = 70 € (Prediction P4a) Finally, the third part of the 
questionnaire aimed at investigating whether the subjects‟ behaviour changes as the value of 
the unilateral cooperation gain L increases from 50 € to 95 €, with p = 0.75 and H being kept 
constant and given the value H = 160 € (prediction P4b). 
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To facilitate the subject‟s task, each part of the folder included a series of 3 questions 
which was built following the same pattern. A typical choice situation (drawn from the first 
part of the questionnaire) is reproduced in appendix A. In the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 questions, the subject 
was provided with the extreme values under investigation (p = 0 and p = 1; H = 100 € and H = 
190 €; L = 50 € and L = 95 € respectively). In the 3rd question, a table recapitulated the whole 
range of 10 or 11 values
6
; for each value in the table, the subject had to choose between 
cooperation and non cooperation by tipping the appropriate box. Note that the 
cooperative/non cooperative options were actually neutrally labelled „red‟/‟blue‟, while the 
UCs (resp. SCs) were labeled „type (a) agents‟ (resp. „type (b) agents‟) to keep the wording as 
neutral as possible and avoid any framing effects, due to social and/or moral considerations 
for instance
7
 . 
The folder took about 15 minutes to be completed. The subjects were given written 
instructions, which were complemented with some oral instructions. In particular, the subjects 
were reminded that their partner would change from one question to another and that they had 
to consider each successive choice in isolation, especially when filling in the tables
8
. Besides, 
they were reminded that there were neither wrong nor right answers, and that they could 
switch from „red‟ to „blue‟ (or the opposite) as often as they wished to, or even choose to 
always play „red‟ or always play „blue‟. 
The participants were paid 5 euros for participating in the whole study (they were paid 
once they had completed the third questionnaire). Moreover, to help them consider their 
decisions as real despite the apparently hypothetical nature of the choice situations, a high-
incentive performance-based payment procedure was also introduced
 
in each session
9
. At the 
beginning of the session, the participants were informed that i) two of them would be selected 
at random at the end of the session
10
, ii) each of them would be asked to draw (at random) one 
of the choice situations included in the questionnaire and to play it out for real against a real 
                                                 
6
 The first two questions actually provided guidance for the subjects. They were introduced after the pilot 
experiment showed that it was easier for the subjects to think of extreme values (which often induce simple 
decisions, due to dominance effects for instance) first.  
7
 Indeed, even if only the „deep structure‟ of the game is theoretically relevant for decision-making, there is a 
huge body of evidence confirming that the „surface structure‟ (framing, wording, etc.) sharply influences the way 
people behave (Poppe, 2005; Wagenaar et al., 1988). In this respect, a socially-oriented framing might prevent a 
proper testing of theoretical predictions and confuse the data.  
8
 Tables offer the advantage of simplicity and compacity, but they may also encourage the use of undesirable 
heuristics.  
9
 Actually, since the sessions were completely independent from each other, each of them had its own 
performance-based payment procedure.  
10
 Even though the ex ante probability of gain is quite low, the subjects appeared to be very sensitive to the 
payment procedure: they focused on the best outcome rather than on the probability of winning.  
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partner (namely another participant), iii) her gains would depend on her previous choice as 
well as on her partner‟s previous choice. More details as regards the payment procedure are 
given in appendix B. 
Note that predictions P1 to P4 could not be tested unless the subjects‟ type is 
identified. In our experiment, each subject was classified through her behaviour in a single 
choice situation, namely the one encapsulated in question 1.2. (“You have 100% chances to 
meet a partner of type (a), who always plays „red‟. Which colour do you choose?”; see 
appendix A). Indeed, this choice situation is the only one in which any self-interested subject 
is required to defect (play „blue‟). So, those subjects who chose to cooperate were labelled as 
non SCs, and the defective ones as SCs (see figure 4). Naturally, this rather weak criterion 
does not ensure that those latter subjects were genuine SCs. But the main point is that their 
behaviour throughout the questionnaire was fully compatible with that of a SC. Besides, and 
quite reassuringly, the rate of subjects labelled as SCs using our criterion appears to be very 
close to that found in Neugebauer et al. (2008)‟s study involving a game of chicken (86,7% 
versus 83%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The identification of each subject‟s type using question 1.2. 
 
It is important to note that those subjects who chose to cooperate in Choice Situation 
1.2. were not classified as UCs, but only as non SCs. To understand why, the argument is 
twofold. First, an important point to make is that we did not need to collect any empirical 
information about the UCs to be able to test predictions P1-P4. Indeed, the behaviour of a UC 
is unambiguous since she always cooperates. So, given the proportion (1 – p) of UCs in the 
population (provided in each scenario of the questionnaire), the proportion of cooperative 
choices among the UCs could be obtained without considering the empirical population of 
The subject is considered as a 
non ‘strategic cooperator’
Question 1.2.: Which colour do you choose when you have 100% chances 
to meet a partner of type (a), who always plays ‘red’ (cooperates). 
If the subject plays:
13.3% of our subjects
actually chose this option
‘red’
(cooperation)
‘blue’
(non cooperation)
The subject is considered as a
‘strategic cooperator’
86.7% of our subjects
actually chose this option
This choice is compatible 
with that of a type (b) agent.
This choice is incompatible 
with that of a type (b) agent.
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UCs (it is simply equal to (1 – p)). Second, we are well aware that the a priori SC and UC two 
categories are unlikely to exhaust the components of real world population. By the way, most 
of the subjects who chose to cooperate in choice situation 1.2. were not genuine UCs, since 
they chose not to cooperate in some other choice situations. So it would have been fallacious 
to label them as UCs.  
 This basic ambiguity, as well as the fact that we were not really interested in the UCs, 
led us to exclude from the set of data that was used to investigate the descriptive accuracy of 
the model all the subjects whose behaviour was not fully compatible with the SC profile
11
. 
After discarding those subjects who appeared to produce erratic answers, we were finally left 
with a 72 subject sample.  
 
4. Results 
 
We successively examine the impact on cooperation of population heterogeneity 
(predictions P1 to P3) and payoff structure (predictions P4a and P4b). 
 
4.1.  Cooperation depending on the structure of the population 
 
We successively discuss the impact of population heterogeneity on cooperation among 
the SCs (P1 and P2) and among the whole population (P3). 
First, note that, thanks to the law of large numbers, the probability   that a SC 
deviates (resp. the probability  1   that a SC cooperates) can be taken as the proportion of 
non cooperative choices (resp. cooperative choices) among the real SC population.  
Now, graph 1 reports both the predicted and observed proportions of defective choices 
among SCs, depending on the hypothetical proportion of SCs in the population (given in the 
scenario). A proportion test shows that, for any strictly positive p, the difference between the 
predicted and observed levels of cooperation is always very significant and positive (every p-
value is equal or inferior to 0.001). Moreover, the degree of over-cooperation increases until p 
= 0.75. To better describe the results, we now distinguish the low and high parts of the curves. 
For any (1 )p T   = 0.5, P1 predicts that the SCs should not cooperate at all. For p = 
0, all the SCs actually defect (as a result of the criterion used to identify the SCs in our 
                                                 
11
 Of course, non-SC subjects were not excluded from the performance-based payment procedure. Neither were 
the subjects who produced erratic answers. 
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population). But when p grows from 0 to 0.5, the gap between the predicted and observed 
levels of cooperation grows, reaching almost 40 points for p = 0.5.  
When  1 0.5p T   , the level of cooperation grows as p increases (i.e. as the 
probability of playing against a SC increases), as predicted by P2. And the theoretical and 
empirical curves appear to be remarkably parallel, which suggests that the model works 
qualitatively well when the SCs are in a majority in the population (p > 0.5). Nevertheless, the 
initial gap between the predicted and observed levels of cooperation remains, and is kept 
rather constant for 0.5 p   1. It is noteworthy that, in the standard case without 
heterogeneity (i.e. for p = 1), the level of cooperation is 20 points higher than expected: while 
no more than half cooperative choices should be observed among the SCs, this rate actually 
reaches 0.7.  
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Graph 1. Predicted and observed proportion of non-cooperative choices among the SCs  
depending on the hypothetical proportion of SCs in the population. 
 
Now, as regards P3, note that the proportion of cooperative choices in the whole 
population, given by    1 1p p   , was computed using the observed proportion  1   
of cooperative choices among the SCs (identified as such using Question 1.2.), the 
hypothetical proportion p of SCs in the population given in each scenario, and the 
hypothetical complementary proportion  1 p  of UCs.  
P3 predicts that the proportion of cooperative choices in the whole population 
depending on the proportion of SCs in the population should decrease from 1 to 0.5 as p 
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grows from 0 to 0.5 (see graph 2, theoretical values). Then, this proportion should remain 
constant, the increase in the proportion of cooperative SCs being exactly counterbalanced by 
the decrease in the proportion of UCs (who always cooperate). Though not completely 
supported by our data from a quantitative point of view, this strong theoretical property 
appears to be qualitatively rather satisfied. 
As regards the left part of graph 2 (from p = 0 to p = 0.25), the theoretical and empirical 
curves match very well. Looking at graph 1 may help understand why. Actually, our SCs do 
cooperate more than expected (remember they should not cooperate at all), but since they are 
in a small minority in the population, their behaviour has not much impact on global 
behaviour
12
.  
Now, from p = 0.33 to p = 0.5, cooperation decreases slower than it should, so that the 
global level of cooperation remains 20 points too high. Once again, the explanation can be 
found in graph 1. Indeed, the degree of over-cooperation among the SCs grows with p. Since 
their weight in the population increases, the degree of over-cooperation among the whole 
population also increases. 
From p = 0.5 to p = 1, the level of cooperation remains too high (it varies between 0.7 
and 0.8 instead of remaining constant at 0.5). Moreover, the empirical curve exhibits a 
somewhat inverse-U shape instead of a flat shape, which is due to the fact that the degree of 
over-cooperation among the SCs tends to decrease as p grows. Since their weight in the 
population increases, the aggregate level of over-cooperation is also affected downward.  
Anyway, a striking and noteworthy result is that the level of cooperation observed for 
1p   is equal to its value for p = 0.5, which fits the theoretical prediction and suggests that 
the difference between predicted and observed behaviour is essentially quantitative: on the 
one hand, the level of cooperation does not dramatically decrease as it should, and it always 
exceeds the predicted level by about 20 points; but, on the other hand, the empirical curve 
appears to be quite remarkably parallel to the theoretical one. 
                                                 
12
 Global behaviour is actually almost entirely driven by the UCs‟ deterministic behaviour. 
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Graph 2. Predicted and empirical proportion of cooperative choices in the whole population 
 depending on the hypothetical proportion of SCs in the population. 
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4.2. Cooperation depending on the structure of the payoffs 
 
The level of cooperation has been shown experimentally to depend on the structure of the 
payoffs (see for instance Sherman, 1969 or Güth et al., 1997). CDR (2007) predicts how the 
structure of the payoffs should affect behaviour (predictions P4a and P4b). Our experimental 
study precisely allows us to investigate P4a and P4b and to identify the role played by H, the 
unilateral defection gain, and by L, the unilateral cooperation gain.  
First, the level of cooperation is expected to decrease as H grows (P4a), with a 
maximum rate of cooperative choices of 1 for H = 100 €, and a flat right part and no 
cooperation at all when H becomes superior or equal to 160 €.  
The level of cooperation actually appears to decrease as H grows. Once again, the 
observed level of cooperation appears to be quantitatively higher than expected by 30 to 50 
points, and this difference in level is highly significant for all H (z test; every p-value is equal 
or inferior to 0.001). But, on the other hand, the empirical curve appears to be qualitatively 
similar to the theoretical one (see Graph 3).  
Quite remarkably, the rates of cooperative choices obtained for the last 4 values (H = 
160 €, 170 €, 180 €, and 190 €) appear not to be significantly different (proportion test, p-
value: 0.754). The level of cooperation can thus be considered as constant between H = 160 € 
and H = 190 €, which fits the theoretical prediction. However, the cooperation curve is still 
strongly translated upward: while for any H > 160 €, theory predicts that the SCs should no 
longer cooperate, the level of cooperation actually remains strongly positive (about 0.25/0.3) 
even for the very deterrent gain of 190 €.  
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Graph 3. Predicted and empirical proportion of non cooperative choices among the SCs  
depending on unilateral defection gain H. 
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Now, the level of cooperation is expected to increase as L grows (P4b), with a flat left 
part and no cooperation at all as long as L is inferior or equal to 70 €, and a maximum rate of 
cooperative choices of about 0.25 for L = 95 € (see Graph 4).  
The level of cooperation actually appears to increase as L grows. However, as 
previously, the observed level of cooperation appears to be much higher than predicted (with 
all p-values equal or inferior to 0.001). Three striking features are worth noticing. First, the 
left part of the empirical curve (L < 60 €) is flat, as predicted by the model. There is naturally 
a quantitative difference, since some cooperation exists while there should be no cooperation 
at all. But it seems that, as expected, proneness to cooperation is not sensitive to variations of 
L when L is kept small. As a second important feature, the rate of cooperative choices 
dramatically increases when L grows from 60 to 80 €, as if the subjects became highly 
sensitive to variations of L when L is given intermediate values, with a gap reaching 50 points 
for L = 80 €. Thirdly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, the right part of the empirical 
curve appears to be flat, as if the subjects became insensitive to variations of L when L is 
given high values (from 80 to 95 €). A proportion test run on the rate of non cooperative 
choices for these 4 values gives a p-value of 0.964. 
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SCs depending on unilateral cooperation gain L. 
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Methodological discussion: the experimental design 
 
Part of the gap between the predicted and observed levels of cooperation might be 
explained by the fact that it was actually impossible to fully replicate experimentally the 
conditions under which the theoretical predictions were obtained. To be specific, two main 
assumptions had to be made as regards the behaviour of real subjects when designing the 
experiment to allow for the testing of the model. Since it is actually impossible to know 
whether these assumptions were experimentally satisfied or not, they might be viewed as 
undesirable „auxiliary hypotheses‟, raising a Duhem-Quine argument and preventing us from 
drawing clear-cut conclusions from our data (see for instance Starmer, 1999). In the following 
paragraph, we will present these two assumptions, as well as some empirical arguments 
allowing us to remain quite confident about our data.  
The first assumption that was implicitly made in our experimental design regards the 
nature of the equilibrium played by the subjects – namely a mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
Indeed, the four predictions P1 to P4 we aimed at investigating were obtained at mixed-
strategy equilibrium. But the model itself offers multiple equilibria, and we can actually not 
be sure that our subjects coordinated toward the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, 
CDR (2007)‟s theoretical results were obtained under the assumption of symmetry, under 
which the agents are assumed to consider that any partner of the same type should have the 
same beliefs as theirs. Obviously, this may not be true in the real world. In our experiment, it 
may have been the case that some of our subjects considered that their fellow player would 
have different beliefs and would play a different equilibrium.  
Though theoretically valid, we think that this argument can be dismissed using several 
empirical counter-arguments. First, the qualitative similarity between the theoretical and 
empirical curves (see Graphs 1 to 4, Section 3 supra) suggests that the experiment succeeded 
quite well in capturing the qualitative features of the model. Second, even though the subjects 
did actually not elaborate mixed strategies, the fact that aggregate behaviour roughly 
coincides with mixed-strategy equilibrium behaviour gives some weight to the as if 
hypothesis, which has received some support in economics (Friedman and Savage, 1948). By 
the way, mixed strategies can also be interpreted as the aggregate result of the mix of different 
pure strategies among the subjects.  
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The second assumption we wish to discuss here concerns the categorization of the 
population. The questionnaire implicitly followed CDR (2007) in assuming that the 
population of subjects is divided into two classes of agents, namely the SCs and the UCs. As 
already mentioned in Section 3, we are well aware that these a priori categories are unlikely to 
exhaust the components of real world population, and that some other behavioural types 
could be identified (for instance a category of „unconditional defectors‟, who always choose 
to defect; see Neugebauer et al., 2008 for an example of a four-type categorization). 
Obviously, if some subjects in our experimental study turned out to be of another type, this 
would prevent us from testing the two-type model under consideration. However, several 
counter-arguments can be put forward, that minimize the empirical weight of the previous 
argument. First, in the pilot experiment as well as in the final experiment, none of the subjects 
showed either disagreement or surprise toward the two-type categorization when filling out 
the questionnaire. Furthermore, remember that only those subjects whose behaviour was 
consistent with the behaviour of a SC were retained for data analysis. Maybe they were 
actually something else, but for our purpose, only their behaviour matters. Besides, the 
subjects whose behaviour was inconsistent with expected-value maximizing were simply 
considered as non-SCs. Implicitly, this allowed us to take into account the possibility that 
some subjects may be neither SCs nor UCs. And to keep the data as unambiguous as possible, 
these subjects were not included in the final data set. 
 
5.2. Discussion of results 
 
5.2.1. The influence of social determinants  
 
Even though our experimental design may have introduced some noise in the data, it is 
unclear how the simplifications we made could be responsible for the high level of 
cooperation observed among the subjects.  
However, such factors as personality as well as social or equity considerations 
(reviewed in the introduction) may have obviously contributed to our results. For instance, a 
huge amount of recent literature from both social psychology and economics suggests that, 
contrary to what basic theory suggests, people do care about the way gains are shared out 
between them and others (McClintock and Liebrand 1988) and tend to exhibit social 
preferences such as preference for reciprocity or inequity aversion (see Fehr and Fischbacher 
2002 for a survey). Preference for reciprocity entails that actions that are perceived to be kind 
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(respectively hostile) will be reciprocated in a kind (respectively hostile) manner (Rabin 1993; 
Levine 1998; Charness and Rabin 2002). Inequity aversion can be viewed as a kind of 
altruism: inequity-averse people will try to promote their partner‟s earnings – provided these 
earnings remain acceptable as compared to theirs (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000). In this framework, even selfish people may be induced to make „non-
selfish‟ choices. This may contribute to explain why our subjects cooperated much more than 
predicted.  
Demographic as well as socio-cultural determinants may have also played some role in 
our results. For instance, social identity has been shown to promote cooperative behaviour 
among in-group members (Dawes et al. 1988; Kollock 1998b; see also Yamagishi and 
Kiyionari, 2000 and Simpson, 2006 for some recent work on the links between social identity 
and cooperation), due to „the shared and mutual perception by in-group members of their 
interests as interchangeable‟ (Turner et al. 1987). Since our sample was highly homogeneous 
as regards age and human capital (all of them were graduate students), as well as social group 
identity (most of them were students in a French „Grandes Ecole‟), it may be the case that all 
these factors combined to induce highly cooperative behaviour.  
To complete this discussion, we would like to raise another possible explanation for 
the high level of cooperation observed among our subjects. This explanation has to do with 
the subjects‟ attitude toward risk.  
 
5.2.2. The influence of attitudes towards risk 
 
In line with most game theoretical models, our theoretical framework assumes that the 
SCs maximize the expected value of the game. However, our experimental findings suggest 
that the SC-type individuals might actually (subjectively) deal with outcome and probability 
in a non linear fashion, thus exhibit somewhat more sophisticated preferences under risk than 
usually assumed in game theory.  
Intuitively, the basic uncertainty that is associated with the partner‟s behaviour 
(Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002) makes it natural to consider interactive situations as 
a kind of risky situation – involving risky payoffs with a probability distribution over the 
payoffs. In this perspective, the decision to cooperate (or trust one‟s partner) may be viewed 
by the subject as equivalent to taking a risky bet (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004, Eckel and 
Wilson 2004). If so, her risk orientation is likely to influence her „cooperative attitude‟. In the 
game of chicken (and contrary to what happens in the PDG), the cooperative strategy (action 
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c, see figure 1 supra) appears to be less risky than the non cooperative one (action d), since it 
allows to avoid the worst payoff in the worst outcome (bilateral defection). So, in a game of 
chicken, more risk aversion can be expected to result in more cooperation. In our theoretical 
framework, the risky nature of the game is all the more obvious since it introduces a second 
kind of uncertainty through the probabilistic type of the partner. The decision maker has to 
think about both the type (SC or UC) and the behaviour (cooperation or defection) of her 
partner. To our knowledge, only a few experimental studies have been trying to explicitly link 
together attitude toward risk and attitude toward cooperation (Bohnet et al. 2008; Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser 2004; Brennan et al. 2007; Dolbear and Lave 1966; Eckel and Wilson 2004; 
Sabater-Grande et Georgantzis 2002; Lönnqvist et al. 2009). Unfortunately, no conclusive 
result can be drawn from these quite contradictory studies. Part of the apparent contradiction 
may come from the fact that attitude toward risk strongly depends on the way it is elicited. 
For instance, the subjects‟ degree of risk aversion turns out to be higher when elicited in an 
interactive context (in a social dilemma for instance) than in an exogenously risky context 
(through the comparison of lotteries for instance) (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004; Lönnqvist et 
al. 2009). This may obviously confuse the investigation of the connections between attitude 
toward risk and proneness to cooperation. 
Anyway, a huge body of theoretical as well as empirical literature in the field of 
individual decision making under risk strongly confirms that most people are not risk neutral 
and do not treat outcomes and probabilities linearly when making risky decisions (see for 
instance Camerer, 1995 or Starmer, 2000 for a survey). Insofar as interactive decisions can be 
viewed as risky, it does not look implausible that individuals use similar decision rules, and 
deal with outcomes and probabilities in a non linear fashion, instead of maximizing expected-
value as postulated by the basic model.
 
Formally, the SCs‟ probability of defection, given by
 1 T
p


 , can be formulated as 
an explicit function of both the structure of the payoffs and the proportion p of SCs in the 
population (see Result (i), Section 2, supra). The fact that the probability  (empirically given 
by the frequency of defective choices) be much lower than theoretically expected can be 
imputed to either some overweighting of the probability p of meeting a SC, or undervaluation 
of  1 T , or even both.  
For instance, reading graph 1 horizontally shows that the rate of cooperative choices of 
0.3 that should be observed for p = 0.7 is actually observed for p = 0.45. This suggests that 
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subjects behave as if they considered p as much higher than it actually is (they cooperate 
much more than they theoretically should), i.e. as if they overweighted it.  
Similarly, assuming that the subjects deal with outcomes through some utility function 
u might help understand why they behave as they do when H varies. The gap between 
observed and predicted behaviour is especially wide (reaching 50 points), and the difference 
between the two increases then decreases as H grows. Since the impact of H on behaviour is 
examined for a given proportion of SCs, which is kept constant throughout the questions (p = 
0.75), subjective probability weighting alone cannot account for the data. A more plausible 
explanation is that the subjects do not value their defection gain as much as they should, had 
they been expected-value maximizers. For instance, reading graph 3 horizontally shows that 
the level of defection observed when H = 150 € (resp. H = 190) corresponds to what was 
expected for H = 120 € (resp. H = 130 €). This suggests that the subjects behave as if they 
systematically and significantly (by 60 € in the most extreme case) undervalued either the 
unilateral defection gain H (i.e. u(H) < H) or the difference between H and the other elements 
of the matrix (being held constant). Such undervaluation of the defection gain may help 
understand why the subjects keep on cooperating while they no longer should. 
Similarly, since the impact of L on behaviour is examined for a given proportion of 
SCs (namely p = 0.75), most of the large and varying gap between predicted and observed 
behaviour cannot be interpreted in terms of probability weighting alone. Reading graph 4 
horizontally shows that, for instance, the level of cooperation obtained for L = 50 € is 
identical to the theoretically predicted one for L = 85 €. This suggests that the subjects behave 
as if they systematically and significantly (by 35 € in the most extreme case) overvalued 
either the unilateral cooperation gain L (i.e. u(L) > L) or the difference between L and the 
other elements of the matrix (being held constant). Such overvaluation of the cooperation gain 
may help understand why the subjects begin to cooperate while they should keep on 
defecting. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The experimental study described in this paper aimed at investigating whether, and to 
what extent, the structure of the population and the structure of the payoffs are likely to affect 
cooperative behaviour in a game of chicken – problems rarely studied in the experimental 
economics literature. For this purpose, we used the theoretical framework developed by 
Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2007), which considered a population with two types of agents, 
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depending on their general attitude toward cooperation. We then confronted the main two 
theoretical predictions of this model with actual experimental behaviour. The first (and rather 
counterintuitive) prediction is that rational or self-interested individuals tend to cooperate 
more as their proportion in the population increases. The second prediction is that the level of 
cooperation is a decreasing (respectively increasing) function of the unilateral defection 
(respectively cooperation) gain. From a qualitative point of view, both predictions appear to 
be well supported by our data.  
Nevertheless, our data show a much higher level of cooperation than theoretically 
expected. Although usual psychological, sociological and cognitive explanations should 
obviously not be excluded, our data suggest that attitudes towards risk, and more specifically 
the way individuals subjectively deal with outcomes and probabilities, may have also 
contributed to this strikingly high level of cooperation. Game theory usually assumes 
expected-value maximizing preferences. Contemplating the possibility that individuals may 
maximize their expected utility, or even some more sophisticated objective functions (as in 
„Prospect Theory‟, Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992 for instance), 
may help account for the gap between standard theoretical predictions and observed 
behaviour. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to ensure that the subjects actually dealt with 
outcomes and probabilities the way we suggest. In this respect, a future track for research 
would be to build an extension of CDR (2007), in which agents are endowed with preferences 
that allow them to deal with both outcomes and probabilities in a non-linear fashion. In such 
an extended framework, perhaps some new predictions could be drawn and confronted with 
experimental behaviour in a more systematic manner.  
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Appendix A: A typical choice situation  
(drawn from the first part of the questionnaire, translated from French) 
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You are facing a partner. You both have two available options: play Red or play Blue. You 
do not know what your partner is going to do, but your gain depends on both your own choice 
and hers.  
The matrix below gives the different choices for you and your partner, as well as the 
corresponding gains. Your gains are in bold:  
 
The choice of my partner
Red Blue
My choice
Red
Blue
100 €; 100 € 70 €; 120 €
120 €; 70 € 50 €; 50 €
 
Question 1.1 : 
You have 100% chances to meet a partner of type (b) who plays either Red or Blue, 
depending on her potential gains as well as on what she thinks you are going to play. 
Which colour do you choose? 
□ Red 
□ Blue 
 
Question 1.2 : 
You have 100% chances to meet a partner of type (a) who always plays Red. 
Which colour do you choose? 
□ Red 
□ Blue 
 
Question 1.3 : 
We are now in the general case. Your partner has: 
- X% chances to be of type (a), in which case she always plays Red,  
and 
- (100-X)% chances to be of type (b), in which case she plays either Red or Blue, 
depending on her potential gains as well as on what she thinks you are going to 
play. 
 
Which colour do you choose for the different values of X that are given in the table 
below? Just tick the appropriate box (Red or Blue) for each of these values. 
 
 
 
X% chances to meet a 
partner of type (a) 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
25% 
(or 
 
33% 
(or 
 
40% 
 
50% 
 
60% 
 
66% 
(or 
 
75% 
(or 
 
90% 
 
100% 
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(who always plays Red) 
 
Your choice 
 
 
1/4) 1/3) 2/3) 3/4) 
Red            
Blue            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 1.1. 
 
Question 1.2. 
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Appendix B: The performance-based payment procedure 
 
 
At the beginning of the session, the subjects were given full information about the 
following payment procedure. They were given several examples of how it works, so that 
they could be aware of their interest to give sincere and well-considered answers when filling 
out the questionnaire.  
The subjects were informed that two of them (the „winners‟ in the following) would be 
selected at random among the participants and that, for each of the „winners‟, a choice 
situation would then be selected at random and played out for real against her partner in the 
game. Her final payment would thus depend on both her own choice and the choice made by 
her partner in the situation/scenario under consideration. Before filling out the folder, the 
subjects were thus made aware that it was in their interest to carefully take into account the 
behavioural characteristics of their partner when making their decision in each choice 
situation (that is, to carefully take into account probabilistic information, provided in each 
scenario, regarding the distribution of behavioural types in the population). They were made 
aware that, when implementing the final payment, the uncertainty as regards the type of their 
partner in the randomly selected choice situation would be solved by drawing it at random 
using the proportions given in the scenario under consideration.  
Suppose that, in the scenario considered, 75% of the population is supposed to be of 
SC-type. Then, each „winner‟ was invited to pick up a token among four tokens numbered 
from 1 to 4 and informed that, if she picked up the token numbered 1 (resp. numbered from 2 
to 4), it would mean that her partner was a UC (resp. a SC). If the partner turned out to be a 
UC (who always cooperates), the gain of the winner would be determined at the intersection 
between her own previous choice to the question under consideration and the cooperative 
choice of her UC-type partner. If the partner turned out to be a SC, the gain of the winner 
would be determined at the intersection between her own previous choice to the question 
under consideration and the choice made by a real SC-type subject, picked up at random 
among all the SC-type subjects in the experiment. Since all the participants had been 
attributed a number at the beginning of the experiment, a number was selected at random 
among all the numbers corresponding to those participants whose behaviour was SC-
compatible (that is, who had chosen not to cooperate on Question 1.2; see Section 3 supra). 
The choice of this SC-type subject (remaining anonymous to the „winner‟) was then 
confronted to the „winner‟‟s choice to determine her final payment. 
 
 
 
